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VOIR DIRE-PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ON THE BASIS OF
RACE-EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-STANDING-The United States
Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause prohib-
its a prosecutor from exercising peremptory challenges to remove
jurors of a race other than the defendant's, and that a defendant
has standing to contest such use of peremptory challenges al-
though the defendant and the challenged juror do not share the
same racial identity.
Powers v Ohio, US , 111 S Ct 1364 (1991).
In 1990, an Ohio grand jury charged Larry Joe Powers, a white
male, with two counts of aggravated murder and one count of at-
tempted aggravated murder.1 Powers pleaded not guilty to all
counts and exercised his right to a trial by jury.2
During voir dire, the prosecutor used a total of seven peremptory
challenges to remove black veniremen from the petit jury.3 On
each occasion Powers objected and demanded that the court com-
pel the prosecutor to state the reasons for removal.4 The court con-
sistently overruled each objection and denied each demand.5 The
jury returned verdicts on each count and sentenced Powers to im-
prisonment for a term of fifty-three years to life.'
1. Powers v Ohio, US , 111 S Ct 1364, 1365 (1991). Each count also contained a
firearm charge. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1366. The incidents for which Powers was charged oc-
curred after he and the two victims, apparently his acquaintances, spent the evening drink-
ing at a local tavern. Id. The group returned to the house of one of the victims' and were
greeted by the victim's wife. Id. The three men then engaged in a conversation during which
the victims noticed Powers' gun. Id. According to the wife's testimony, an argument then
ensued during which Powers intimated that he was a hired hitman. Id. Powers then shot
and killed the two men and attempted to kill the wife, who ultimately escaped. Id. There
was no indication that the crimes were racially motivated, as both Powers and the victims
were white. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. "Veniremen" are prospective jurors who may be removed either by a challenge
for cause or a peremptory challenge. Black's Law Dictionary 1556 (West, 6th ed 1990). "Ve-
niremen" is used throughout this note in a gender neutral sense. "Petit jury" is defined as
"the ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action; so called to distinguish it from a
grand jury." Id at 856.
4. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1366. The record itself does not disclose the race of the chal-
lenged jurors, but in raising each objection to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges,
Powers stated that each potential juror was black. Ohio v Powers, 1988 WL 134822 at *5.
This testimony was not contradicted either by the prosecution or by the Court. Id.
5. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1366.
6. Id.
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Powers pursued an appeal,7 contending in part that the prosecu-
tor used peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner which
violated Powers' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.8 The
Ohio Court of Appeals rejected Powers' contentions." The Supreme
Court of Ohio similarly disposed of the appeal, stating that there
was no substantial constitutional question. 10
Powers timely appealed to the United States Supreme Court.,,
Certiorari was granted on the issue of whether, based on the Equal
Protection Clause, a criminal defendant may object to the race-
based exclusion of jurors through peremptory challenges, regard-
less of whether the defendant and the jurors are of the same race.1
2
7. Id. The following eight assignments of error were raised upon appeal:
1. the trial court erred in failing to grant Powers' motion for a directed verdict of
aquittal as to the issue of prior calculation and design;
2. the convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and should therefore be
reversed;
3. the trial court erred by overruling Powers' pre-trial motion for dismissal of the
indictment on the ground that Ohio's death penalty statute violates the United
States and Ohio Constitutions;
4. Powers was prejudiced by the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges, and the trial court erred in failing to compel the prosecutor to explain reasons
for removal;
5. the trial court erred in allowing irrelevant hearsay testimony, which prejudiced
Powers, to be admitted as evidence;
6. the trial court erred in allowing a specific witness of the state's to testify;
7. Powers was denied a fair trial due to the prosecutor's misconduct during closing
arguments; and
8. Powers was denied the right to assistance of effective counsel.
Id.
8. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1366. The Sixth Amendment states:
[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which .district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor;
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
US Const, Amend VI.
The Fourteenth Amendment states, "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
9. Powers, 1988 WL 134822 at 14. The court found Powers' reliance upon case law
to be misplaced. Id at 5. The court distinguished the case from the precedents cited by
Powers by concluding that, as members of Powers' race were not excluded from jury service,
the prosecution was not bound to give explanations for the removal of jurors other than
Powers' race. Id at 10.
Cases relied upon by Powers were, among others: Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986),
and Peters v Kiff, 407 US 493 (1972). For a discussion of Batson, see notes 141-68 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Peters, see notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
10. Powers v Ohio, 42 Ohio St 3d 702 (1990).
11. Powers v Ohio, 110 S Ct 1109 (1990).
12. Powers, 111 S Ct 1364 (1990). The Court denied Powers' Sixth Amendment chal-
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The Court broke this issue into two components for purposes of
analysis.13 The Court first questioned whether the Equal Protec-
tion Clause prohibited a prosecutor from exercising racially based
peremptory challenges to remove jurors of a race other than the
defendant's.14 Ultimately answering this question in the affirma-
tive, the Court then questioned whether Powers had the requisite
standing to raise the third-party claims of excluded jurors.
1 5
The Court commenced its analysis by turning to the weight of
precedent.'6 Twenty-six years earlier, the Court was confronted
with essentially the same issue in Swain v Alabama,1 7 with the sin-
gular but vital factual distinction being that in Swain, both the
defendant and the excluded jurors were black. 8 After balancing
the importance of racially neutral jury selection with the tradition
of peremptory challenges, the Court in Swain denied the defend-
ant's equal protection claim.' 9 It was not this denial, however, but
rather the dicta in Swain upon which the Court seized.20 In Swain
the Court intimated that an appeal of the equal protection issue
might be entertained provided that there was proof of the system-
atic exclusion of black veniremen through the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges.2'
The proof which the Court in Swain indicated would support an
lenge by referring to the holding in Holland v Illinois, 493 US 474 (1990), that a defendant
cannot "rely on the Sixth Amendment to object to the exclusion of members of any distinc-
tive group at the peremptory challenge stage." Powers, 111 S Ct at 1370. In Holland, the
Court denied a white defendant's Sixth Amendment challenges to the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges to remove black jurors. Holland, 493 US at 478. The court in Hol-
land concluded that the Sixth Amendment applies to jury selection laws and not to the
actual selection of grand and petit juries. Id at 480. See Powers, 111 S Ct at 1370.
13. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1365.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id at 1367.
17. 380 US 202 (1965).
18. Swain, 380 US at 205. In Swain, a black defendant challenged the removal of
black jurors from the jury panel. Id at 202. The court denied Swain's equal protection chal-
lenge on the grounds that there was no proof of racially discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes by the prosecution. Id. See notes 102-19 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of Swain.
19. Swain, 380 US at 222-28.
20. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1367.
21. Swain, 380 US at 227. Although no black juror had served on a jury in Talladega
County for over fifteen years, the Court concluded that such an absence did not constitute
prima facie evidence of discrimination. Id. Such proof would exist, however, if the defendant
could prove that the prosecution was solely responsible for the continuous removal of black
jurors. Id.
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equal protection challenge was present in Batson v Kentucky.22 In
Batson, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove each
black person on the jury panel. s The defendant objected to the
removals, and the trial judge denied each of the challenges.24 The
jury convicted the defendant on all charges.25
On appeal, the Court in Batson held that a defendant can raise
an equal protection challenge by proving that the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to remove jurors of the defendant's race.26
Prima facie proof could be established if the defendant was a
member of a cognizable racial group and, either (1) members of
this racial group had not served on a jury in a long time, or (2)
members of the defendant's racial group were substantially under-
represented on the venire, and the jury selection process provided
the opportunity for discrimination. Therefore, unlike the Court's
decision in Swain, proof could be established based on the prose-
cutor's actions in a singular case. 8
Though the Batson holding apparantly required the defendant
and the excluded jurors to be of the same race, the Court again
focused on dicta which it stated broadened the narrow holding of
the case.29 According to the Court, the Batson decision emphasized
the harm which resulted to both the individual and to the commu-
nity at large from the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges.30 Such harm was not predicated upon the race of the de-
fendant.31 The Court found that such reasoning necessitated the
conclusion that Batson did not limit equal protection challenges to
situations in which the defendant and the excluded jurors shared
racial identity.32
22. 476 US 79 (1986). In Batson, a black defendant was indicted on charges of second
degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. Batson, 476 US at 82. During voir dire, the
prosecutor removed all four black jurors through peremptory challenges. Id at 83.
23. Id.
24. Id. The trial judge determined that peremptory challenges could be used to re-
move anyone and that the Sixth Amendment cross-section requirements applied only to the
selection of the venire and not to the selection of the jury itself. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id at 90-93. The decision in Batson overruled Swain in all areas in which the two
holdings were inconsistent. Id at 100 n 25.
27. Id at 94-95.
28. Id.
29. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1368.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. In support of the broad interpretation given to the Batson holding, the Court
looked to sources other than case law. Id at 1368-69. Citing excerpts from Alex de Toc-
queville's Democracy in America, which speaks of the civic honor and responsibility of par-
1028 Vol. 30:1025
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The Powers Court found further support in Peters v Kiff 3 for
the conclusion that constitutional challenges to the use of per-
emptories were not restricted to instances of shared racial identity
between defendant and juror.3 4 Peters, like the case at bar, focused
on a white defendant's challenges to the prosecution's removal of
black jurors.35 Although Peters failed to produce a single majority
opinion, six of the justices agreed that racial discrimination in jury
selection was reprehensible and that a defendant, regardless of his
race, may challenge such discrimination.3"
The Court determined that the treatment of the issue in Peters,
Batson and Swain illustrated a gravitation toward a broadening of
the application of the Equal Protection Clause and a movement
away from rigid restrictions based on racial similarity.31 Contrary
to the appellee's urging, the Court found that a stigma attached to
an individual removed from jury duty solely on account of race.38
Acknowledging the broadening application of the Equal Protection
Clause through precedent and the harm accruing to individuals
discriminatorily excluded from jury service, the Court concluded
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited a prosecutor from us-
ing peremptory challenges to exclude qualified jurors from jury
duty solely because of their race.3
Having reached this conclusion, the Court then engaged in a cur-
sory analysis of whether Powers had standing to raise the third-
party claims of the excluded jurors. 40 The majority reiterated the
ticipation in jury duty, the Court feared that the discriminatory removal of jurors would
harm not only a person's faith in the judicial system, but consequently, their willingness to
participate in it as well. Id. The Court also looked for support in passages from the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited disqualifications for jury duty to be based solely on
race. Id at 1369.
33. 407 US 493 (1972).
34. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1369.
35. Peters, 407 US at 494. In Peters, the defendant was convicted of burglary by an
all-white jury. Id. The defendant contended that the exclusion of black jurors from his jury
was invalid under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteeth Amend-
ment. Id. The lower courts concluded that the defendant had not suffered any unconstitu-
tional damages because he was not black. Id. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court
reversed. Id at 505.
36. Id at 504. Moreover, the Peters Court, like that in Batson, spoke of the harm
stemming from an exclusion of a large and identifiable class of jurors from jury participation
and concluded that this harm should be avoided in all cases, not just in those cases where
the defendant and the excluded jurors are of the same race. Id at 503-05.
37. Powers, 111 S Ct 1368.
38. Id at 1370. The Court rejected the appellee's argument that, because all jurors are
potentially subject to removal based on race, no discrimination exists. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id at 1370-74.
10291992
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requirements of third-party standing as (1) Powers' suffering an
"injury in fact," (2) the existence of a close relationship between
Powers and the excluded jurors, and (3) the existence of an obsta-
cle preventing the excluded jurors from initiating their own
actions.41
The Court determined that Powers was harmed because discrim-
ination during voir dire not only cast the entire proceeding in a
questionable light, but placed both the fairness and the integrity of
the trial in doubt as well.42 According to the Court, the discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges invited cynacism as to the jury's
neutrality.43
Addressing the existence of a close relationship, the Court con-
cluded that both a defendant and the excluded jurors have an in-
terest in eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom and,
consequently, that a defendant would be a motivated advocate for
the excluded jurors' rights.44 The Court then analyzed several in-
stances in which close relationships were found to exist, concluding
that the relationship between a defendant and an excluded juror
was as close, if not closer.
4 5
The Court further concluded that the financial barriers to initi-
ating a suit, the lack of opportunity for a juror to be heard before
removal, and the unlikelihood of an excluded juror being able to
prove discrimination constituted obstacles hindering the excluded
jurors from raising their own claims.48 The Court consequently de-
termined that Powers had standing to raise the third-party claims
of the excluded jurors.47
In a synthesis of the answers to the two sub-questions, the Court
held that a defendant may object under the Equal Protection
Clause to the race-based exclusion of jurors through peremptory
challenges, regardless of whether the excluded jurors and the de-
fendant share the same race.4 8
41. Id, citing Singleton v Wulff, 428 US 106 (1976); Craig v Boren, 429 US 190
(1976); Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438 (1972).
42. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1371.
43. Id.
44. Id at 1372.
45. Id. The relationships which the Court looked at were: Planned Parenthood offi-
cials and a licensed physician raising the constitutional claims of their patients; a licensed
beer vendor raising the claims of his customers; and an attorney raising due process claims
of his clients. Id.
46. Id at 1372-73.
47. Id.
48. Id at 1373. In a 7-2 decision, the Court reversed and remanded the case, stating
that it was the responsibility of the district courts to develop rules allowing for legitimate
1030 Vol. 30:1025
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, contended that the majority's holding was clearly
against both the weight of precedent and the principle underlying
the Equal Protection Clause.4 9 In support of these assertions, Jus-
tice Scalia analyzed the treatment of actions brought by defend-
ants challenging the removal of jurors from duty.5° The dissent ve-
hemently stated that in each successful challenge, the defendant
and the excluded juror shared the same race.'
Addressing the cases relied upon by the majority, Justice Scalia
contended that racial similarity was an indispensible element of
those various holdings as well.52 The Justice argued that in Batson,
racial identity between the parties was an inherent limitation in
the holding, and he referred to various passages in Batson which
he believed supported this view.53 The dissent also argued that the
majority's decision constituted not merely an expansion of, but a
complete departure from the decision rendered in Batson, in that
the defendant was essentially granted the right to have his jury
completely free from peremptory challenges due to race.5
Justice Scalia also attacked the Court's treatment of Peters by
objections to the use of racially motivated peremptory challenges. Id at 1373-74. Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter joined in Justice Kennedy's
opinion. Id at 1374.
49. Id at 1374-80 (Scalia dissent).
50. Id at 1374-77.
51. Id. Scalia focused in particular upon the decision rendered in Strauder, 100 US at
304, in which a black defendant challenged the state's jury selection laws, which essentially
prohibited blacks from participating as jurors. Strauder, 100 US 303 (1880). Scalia com-
mented that it was-neither suggested in Strauder, and it was quite unthinkable, "that a
white defendant could have had his conviction reversed on the basis of the same statute.
The statute did not exclude members of his race, and thus did not deprive him of the equal
protection of the laws." Powers, 111 S Ct at 1374.
52. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1375.
53. Id at 1374-76. The Batson court stated that before one may challenge the use of
peremptory challenges, "the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from
the venire members of the defendant's race." Batson, 476 US at 96. The Batson Court also
stated that "the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not
exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race." Id at 86. Justice
Scalia asserted that racial identity was absolutely necessary to raise a challenge. Powers, 111
S Ct at 1376.
The majority responded to this allegation by contending that its holding was not inconsis-
tent with the holding in Batson. Id at 1373-74. According to the Court, such emphasis was
merely evidence that, in some cases, racial similarity may predispose a potential juror to
favor a particular party. Id. Admitting that racial identity may be a factor in some cases, the
Court contended that it was not an indispensible factor and that it was not always relevant.
Id.
54. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1381.
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stating that, contrary to the majority's representations, in actuality
no Justice in the plurality opinion"5 relied upon the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.5 6 In Justice Scalia's opinion, Batson and Peters were
illustrative of the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause does
not allow a defendant to challenge the removal of a juror of an-
other race.57
The dissenting opinion looked for further support of this conclu-
sion by analogizing the treatment of Sixth Amendment claims to
what Scalia believed should be the treatment of equal protection
claims.58 The opinion referred to the decision rendered in Holland
v Illinois,59 in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment did
not prevent the use of peremptory challenges to remove people be-
longing to a group which might unduly favor one side. Justice
Scalia believed that a shared racial identity between a defendant
and a potential juror may encourage such a juror to "unduly favor
one side," and concluded that the Equal Protection Clause must be
interpreted in the same light. 1
Justice Scalia likened the majority's dispostion of the case to
that in Miranda v Arizona,e2 which in the Justice's view "unlocked
the key to the jail house door to free the unquestionably guilty.
'63
Yet the dissent noted that in Miranda the "unlocking" related to
the defendant's own rights, whereas in the case at bar the "unlock-
ing" would stem from the violation of a third party's rights.6 4 Jus-
tice Scalia concluded the dissent by stating that the majority es-
55. Id at 1376. A "plurality opinion" is defined as "an opinion of an appellate court
in which more justices join than in any concurring opinion as distinguished from a majority
opinion in which a larger number of justices on the panel join than not." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 1154 (West, 6th ed 1990).
56. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1376.
57. Id at 1377. In support of this conclusion, Justice Scalia mentioned various cases
which he believed analogous to the case at bar. Id at 1376-77. In Alexander v Louisiana, 405
US 625 (1972), the Court held that a male defendant's equal protection rights were not
violated by the removal of women from his grand jury. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1376-77. In the
same vein, in Castenda v Partida, 430 US 482 (1977), the Court held that in order to raise
an equal protection challenge, the defendant must prove that his race was under-repre-
sented in the grand jury. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1377.
58. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1377.
59. 493 US 474 (1990).
60. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1376.
61. Id at 1381.
62. 384 US 436 (1966). Miranda stood for the proposition that at the time of an
arrest, a detainee must be notified of various rights, otherwise his due process rights are
violated. Miranda, 384 US 436 (1966).
63. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1381.
64. Id.
1032 Vol. 30:1025
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sentially allowed a convicted criminal to walk free because another
person's rights were violated. 5
The treatment of peremptory challenges by both the majority
and dissenting opinions in Powers must be placed within the his-
torical context of peremptory challenges. Blackstone defined pe-
remptory challenges as "arbitrary and capricious challenge[s] to a
certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all. ''66 De-
spite their arbitrary nature, Blackstone nevertheless believed that
peremptory challenges performed a vital and useful service, 7 and
were essentially created to remove prejudice and discrimination
from the verdict.
68
The history of peremptory challenges essentially parallels the
history of jury trials.6 9 The roots of peremptory challenges are
traceable to the Lex Servilia (B.C. 104) and to ancient Rome.7 0
65. Id. Justice Scalia also addressed the majority's treatment of the "standing" issue,
which he labeled as not only irrelevant, but incorrect. Id at 1377-82. Focusing primarily on
the requisite existence of suffering an "injury in fact," Justice Scalia challenged the finding
that Powers had suffered such injury. Id. He pointed to phrases such as "cognizable injury"
as illustrative of the fact that Powers suffered only an "injury in perception." Id at 1379.
Arguing in the alternative, Justice Scalia believed that third-party standing should not be
recognized in this context. Id at 1380. He referred to several cases which denied a defend-
ant's challenges based on the rights of a third party who had been subjected to an illegal
search and seizure. See Ravings v Kentucky, 448 US 98 (1980), and United States v Payner,
447 US 727 (1980). Justice Scalia likened these holdings as representative of how a case
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment should be resolved. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1380.
66. W. Blackstone, 4 Blackstone Commentaries 353 (15th ed 1809).
67. Blackstone, 4 Blackstone Commentaries at 353 (cited in note 66). Blackstone be-
lieved that this procedural device was a "provision full of that tenderness and humanity to
prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous." Id.
68. Id. There are ostensibly four rationales which support this theory. See Note, Bat-
son v Kentucky and the Prosecutional Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious
Equal Protection?, 74 Va L Rev 811, 811 n 2 (1988) (peremptory challenges allow for the
removal of jurors who are suspected to be biased, but who have not behaved in such a
manner as to support a challenge for cause); Steven Saltzburg and Mary Ellen Powers, Pe-
remptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41
Md L Rev 337, 356 (1982) (peremptory challenges allow an attorney to eliminate a juror
whom he feels he has alienated during voir dire); Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Pre-
serving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 Stan L Rev 545, 553 (1975) (peremptory challenges fur-
thermore avoid a "trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes"); Babcock,
27 Stan L Rev at 552 (cited within this note) (peremptory challenges lend legitimacy to the
decision because the litigants choose the jurors). Blackstone, 4 Blackstone's Commentaries
552 (cited in note 66).
69. Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S Cal L Rev 235, 288
(1968).
70. Batson, 476 US at 119 (Burger dissenting). The Lex Servilia required both the
plaintiff and the defendant to compose a list of one hundred jurors, and each party could
reject fifty jurors from the other's list. Id. Those remaining would try the crime. Id. Ancient
Romans were familiar with peremptory challenges as well and utilized them in criminal tri-
als. Id. See also Forsyth, The History of Trial by Jury (1852).
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Furthermore, peremptory challenges are clearly embedded in An-
glo-American common law.7 1 In early common law, a defendant on
trial for a felony was granted thirty-five peremptory challenges
whereas the Crown was entitled to an unlimited number.7 2 The
Crown's abuse of this privilege, however, fostered the passage of
The Ordinance for Inquest,73 which restricted the Crown's chal-
lenges to those for "cause.
'7 4
Despite the elimination of peremptory challenges in The Ordi-
nance for Inquest, the Crown's ability to remove jurors without
cause was preserved in another form, appropriately called "stand
aside. '7 5 Through "stand aside," the Crown could, without expla-
nation, request a juror to excuse himself from the panel, and he
would obligingly remain available until the venire was exhausted."
In the event that the jury panel was filled, those jurors asked to
"stand aside" were dismissed without explanation. 7 Only in the
event of a deficiency in filling the panel did the Crown have to
show cause as to why a juror originally asked to "stand aside" was
unfit for the venire.7 8 Though originally intended to restrict the
Crown's ability to challenge without cause, "stand aside" accom-
plished the same ends as peremptory challenges and was much
broader in scope as the Crown was not limited to a specific number
of "stand aside" challenges. 9
Although peremptory challenges eventually fell into disuse in
England, they flourished in America.8 0 Congress injected peremp-
tory challenges into the federal system by providing defendants
thirty-five challenges for treason, and twenty for other crimes
71. Kuhn, 41 S Cal L Rev at 287-88 (cited in note 69).
72. Swain, 380 US at 212-13.
73. Id. The statute reads: "if they that sue for the King will challenge any. . . Ju-
rors, they shall assign . . . a Cause certaih." The Ordinance for Inquest, 33 Edw 1, Stat 4
(1305).
74. Swain, 380 US at 213.
75. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: The English Practice, 16 Geo L J 438,
447-48 (1927-1928).
76. Moore, 16 Geo L J at 448 (cited in note 75).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Court & the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Chal-
lenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153, 166 n 53 (1989).
80. Moore, 16 Geo L J at 444 (cited in note 75). Scholars attribute this variance, to a
certain degree, to the difference between the English and the American styles of voir dire.
Id. American courts provided for extensive examination which allowed an attorney to exer-
cise his or her right to peremptory challenges in an intelligent manner. Id. An English bar-
rister, however, was severely limited in his or her ability to question a prospective juror, and
therefore had to base his challenges on general impressions. Id at 445.
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which carried the punishment of death-" Although the Constitu-
tion does not formally establish the right to peremptory challenges,
they nevertheless have been regarded as "one of the most impor-
tant rights secured to the accused.
'82
As peremptory challenges became entrenched in American juris-
prudence, there was a simultaneous growth in recognizing that ra-
cial discrimination prevailed in the laws.8 The passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment in 1861 guaranteed the equal protection of
laws to all people.84 Soon thereafter, Congress took further steps to
prevent discrimination from arising in the context of jury selection
through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.85
Before racially based peremptory challenges could be protested,
black perpons had to first defeat discriminatory jury qualification
laws.s In 1879, Strauder v West Virginia87 tested the applicability
of the Fourteenth Amendment to a state jury selection statute.88
The statute allowed only white males to serve as jurors.8 9 Strauder,
a black male, was indicted and convicted of murder by an all-white
jury.90 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Strauder
81. Swain, 380 US at 215-16. The right to peremptory challenges in crimes other
than those previously discussed is unclear. Id. In Ohio, if there is one defendant, each party
is entitled to three challenges in misdemeanor trials, four in non-capital felony cases, and
six in capital cases. OhioRCrP 24(c).
82. Pointer v United States, 151 US 396, 408 (1894).
83. Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6
Loyola LA L Rev 247, 248-49 (1973).
84. US Const, Amend XIV, § 1. For the applicable text, see note 8.
85. Civil Rights Act of 1875, as amended, 18 USC § 243 (1982). The Civil Rights Act
forbade states from racially discriminating in the compiling of jury venires. Id. The text of
the Act reads:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law
shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United
States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude;
and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection
or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such cause, shall
be fined not more than $5000.
Id.
86. Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US 303 (1879).
87. 100 US 303 (1879).
88. Strauder, 100 US 303 (1879).
89. Id at 305. The statute stated: "[A]ll white males who are twenty-one years of age
and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors as herein provided." Id.
There was one exception to the statute, irrelevant in this context, which exempted white
males who served as state officials. Id.
90. Id at 304. Strauder's indictment was given in the Circuit Court of Ohio County,
West Virginia. Id. At trial Strauder was convicted and sentenced, and the case was appealed
to the West Virginia Supreme Court where the decision was affirmed. Id. Strauder prayed
for removal of the case to a United States Circuit Court on the grounds that the West
Virginia Laws regarding jury eligibility violated Strauder's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
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asserted that every citizen, regardless of race or color, was entitled
to the same right of trial by a jury selected without discrimination
against the defendant's race.91
The Court began its analysis of the issue by examining the pur-
pose and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 2 Finding that the
amendment was designed to secure for black persons the same civil
rights that white persons enjoyed, 93 the Court concluded that the
amendment contained an implication of "positive immunity.
'9 4
The jury qualification law violated this positive immunity as it sin-
gled out black persons by denying them the right to participate as
members of the jury. 5
The Court reasoned that the Constitution's guarantee of a trial
by jury is intimately affected by the composition of such a jury,
which is to be composed of one's peers.9" The West Virginia law
prevented only black persons, not white persons, from being tried
by their own peers.9 Therefore, the Court concluded that
Strauder's equal protection rights were violated under West Vir-
ginia's law.98
With Strauder, the first barrier to equal participation in jury
duty had been hurdled; black persons were no longer excluded
Id. This prayer was denied and the case was tried in the state court. Id.
91. Id at 305.
92. Id at 306.
93. Id.
94. Id at 307. The Court defined "positive immunity" to be a:
right, most valuable to the colored race,-the right to exemption from unfriendly leg-
islation against them distinctively as colored,-exemption from legal discriminations,
implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the
rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them
to the condition of a subject race.
Id at 307-08.
95. Id at 308. The Court determined that such a singling out assigned to black ve-
niremen an inferior status, specifically that which the Amendment sought to eliminate. Id.
The Court sought to justify this determination by noting that the same conclusion would
undoubtedly have been reached had West Virginia's jury selection laws discriminated
against white veniremen rather than black veniremen. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id at 310. The Court adamantly qualified its holding by stating that the Four-
teenth Amendment would not prohibit jury selection qualifications to be based on age, gen-
der, or property. Id. According to the Court's conclusion, the Amendment was not designed
to address such issues. Id.
The Court also concluded that Congress authorized the removal from state to circuit court
in cases in which a party presented a federal or constitutional question. Id at 311-12.
The Court's holding in Strauder served as a model for the striking down of numerous
similar state statutes. See, for example, Neal v Delaware, 103 US 370 (1880), and Pierre v
Louisana, 306 US 354 (1938).
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from jury selection.9 Yet a second obstacle still remained. 00 Once
black persons were summoned to the venire, they were still subject
to removal by racially discriminatory peremptory challenges.' 10
Swain embodied the struggle to remove this second obstacle.
0 2
Swain, a black male, was convicted of rape by an all-white jury in
Talledega County Circuit Court.03 Unlike the West Virginia law in
Strauder, however, Alabama's law did not prohibit black persons
from serving on juries.0 4 In fact, black persons were regularly sum-
moned to the venire. 0  Nevertheless, six black veniremen were re-
moved by strikes in Swain.06
In resolving the issue of the constitutionality of the state's strike
system, the Court embarked on a lengthy discussion of the historic
roots of peremptory challenges. 07 Ultimately agreeing with the
state, the Court held that the Constitution does not require an in-
quiry into the prosecutor's use of strikes in a particular trial. 08
The Court essentially established a presumption in favor of the
prosecutor, which in effect stated that a prosecutor's use of pe-
99. Strauder, 100 US 303 (1879).
100. Swain, 380 US 202 (1965).
101. Id. The next case discussed in this note was decided more than eighty years later.
This "jump" in history is not intended to indicate that cases of this nature were no longer
being brought; they were brought under the auspices of Strauder and were decided in the
same manner. It was not until Swain was decided that the principles underlying the Equal
Protection Clause were significantly altered. Id.
102. Id at 210. Alabama used the "strike" jury system which provided, in cases carry-
ing the penalty of death, that the jury panel be comprised of approximately seventy-five
jurors. Id. The size was whittled down by the defendant striking two jurors and the prosecu-
tor striking one, in an alternating fashion, until only twelve remained. Id. Strikes were the
functional equivalent of peremptory challenges and the terms will be used interchangeably.
Id.
103. Id at 203. Although there were eight black persons on the venire, none were on
the panel. Id at 205. Two were excused and the remaining six were struck by the prosecu-
tion during voir dire. Id.
104. Id 206. Alabama law required the jury commission to place the names of male
citizens "generally reputed to be honest and intelligent" and who were "esteemed in the
community for their integrity, good character, and sound judgment" on the jury roll. Id at
206 n 2.
105. Id at 205-06. There were, on average, six to seven black males summoned to each
venire in criminal cases. Id at 205. Statistical evidence indicated that although the black
males in the county constituted approximately 26% of the male population, they only com-
prised 10-15% of the jury panels drawn since 1935. Id.
106. Id. Swain contended that this removal was motivated by racial discrimination
and was therefore unconstitutional. Id at 210. Alabama argued that strikes were necessary in
order to insure a fair and impartial trial, and that strikes were not racially discriminatory as
all people were subject to them. Id at 211-12.
107. Id at 212-19.
108. Id at 221.
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remptory challenges is non-discriminatory. 109 Consequently, the
Court prohibited inquiry into the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges in a specific case. 110
Swain countered this contention by offering proof of the prose-
cutor's consistent removal of black veniremen from juries."' Swain
asserted that this practice, which continued over a number of
years, was evidence of discrimination.1 2 The Court acknowledged
that this allegation was different in kind from a charge of discrimi-
nation in a specific trial."1 " Despite the presumption in favor of the
prosecutor, such behavior would be unconstitutional.
11 4
Notwithstanding this concession, the Court concluded that no
persuasive evidence of discrimination existed in that case. 1 5 Not a
single black person had served on a petit jury in at least fifteen
years, yet this was not deemed conclusive evidence." 6 The Court
stated that the record failed to disclose with any clarity when, how,
and under what circumstances strikes were used by the prosecu-
tion.1117 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that as the defense
played a role in strikes as well, the absence of black persons from
juries cannot be solely attributed to prosecutors absent some con-
crete proof. 18 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the conviction."'
109. Id at 222. The Court justified this presumption by stating that:
rn the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a
pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that
the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise
of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case must be
that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury
to try the case before the court.
Id.
110. Id.
111. Id at 222-23.
112. Id at 223.
113. Id. The difference laid with the presumption. Id. In a specific trial, the presump-
tion in favor of the prosecutor cannot be defeated. Id. But the court stated that:
when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible
for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury
commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no
Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added
significance.
Id.
114. Id at 224.
115. Id.
116. Id. The Court indictated that such evidence would be conclusive only if it clearly
demonstrated the prosecutor's role in keeping black persons off of the juries. Id.
117. Id at 224-25.
118. Id at 227.
119. Id at 228. Justice Harlan concurred in the result, as did Justice Black. Id. Justice
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Peters v Kiff presented a slightly different factual situation than
Swain. In Peters, a white defendant was indicted on a charge of
burglary and was convicted by an all-white jury.120 The defendant
appealed under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' The court of appeals denied peti-
tion for federal habeas corpus'22 on the grounds that as the de-
fendant was not black, he therefore had not suffered any unconsi-
tutional discrimination. 23  In a petition to the United States
Supreme Court, the defendant challenged the exclusion of black
Harlan concurred in order to indicate that the Court did not reach an answer as to the issue
of proof of discrimination over a period of years. Id.
Justice Goldberg dissented and was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas.
Id. Justice Goldberg essentially argued that the majority's holding thwarted the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, furthermore, disregarded binding prece-
dent such as the decision rendered in Strauder. Id. Justice Goldberg contended that al-
though the qualification statute may not be discriminatory on its face, it nevertheless
protected the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Id at 229 (citation omitted).
Therefore, the dissent argued that the majority resurrected the barriers which Strauder
sought to remove. Id at 231.
Justice Goldberg further argued that Swain made out a prima facie case of discrimination
as set forth in Norris v Alabama, 294 US 587, 591 (1935). Swain, 380 US at 232. The ele-
ments of a prima facie case of discrimination include: proof that black persons contitute a
substantial group of the population, that some are qualified to participate as jurors, and
that none have been called to serve as jurors for an extended period of time. Norris, 294 US
at 591. Swain offered proof that black persons were systematically excluded from juries.
Swain, 380 US at 231-33. Once the burden of proving that no black persons had served on
the venire was met, Justice Goldberg believed it reasonable to infer that the state was in-
volved in discriminatory practices. Id at 237. Justice Goldberg contended that, as a result,
Swain had met the intial burden of proof of discrimination, and that the burden conse-
quently should have shifted to the state to refute it. Id at 233. Justice Goldberg concluded
that the state did not sufficiently rebut such an inference. Id at 239.
Justice Goldberg also attacked the majority's recount of the history of peremptory chal-
lenges as inaccurate. Id at 242-44. According to Justice Goldberg, peremptory challenges
were designed primarily as a tool for protecting defendants, a fact which he alleged the
majority failed to note. Id at 242. He reasoned that even though peremptory challenges had
a rich tradition in jury trials, they were not protected by the Constitution, as were juries
chosen in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 244. Therefore, Justice
Goldberg concluded that when in conflict, a nonconstitutional claim must yield to a consti-
tutional claim; peremptory challenges should yield to a jury chosen under Fourteenth
Amendment principles. Id.
120. Peters, 407 US at 494.
121. Id. A Sixth Amendment challenge was not available because the defendant was
convicted before the Court decided Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968), which made
the Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Peters, 407 US at 496.
122. "Habeas Corpus" is Latin for "You have the body." Black's Law Dictionary 709
(West, 6th ed 1990). It is a term given "to a variety of writs. . .having for their object to
bring a party before a court or judge." Id. "The primary function of the writ is to release
from unlawful imprisonment." Id.
123. Peters, 407 US at 494.
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persons from his grand and petit juries, contending that the com-
position of the juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.124
The Court admitted that if such allegations were true, then the
juries were composed in a manner which contravened the Constitu-
tion.1" The Court reasoned such an illegal composition existed re-
gardless of the defendant's particular race.'26 However, the Court
distinguished this issue from the one which was before the Court:
whether a defendant was able to successfully seek relief on the ba-
sis of this constitutional violation. 12 7
The respondent argued that the defendant had not suffered in-
jury caused by the jury selection. 28 The core of this contention
was that a presumption of injury existed only when the excluded
juror and the defendant shared the same race. 29 In absence of ra-
cial identity, the respondent placed a burden upon the defendant
to affirmatively show actual harm. 30
The Court dismissed the respondent's conclusion as too nar-
row. 13 It was the Court's view that Strauder and its progeny spoke
of the various kinds of harm which emanated from discrimination
in jury selection, and that such references necessarily precluded a
narrow application of the holdings. 32 Therefore, according to the
124. Id at 495-97. The respondent contended that the challenge to the petit jury was
not before the Court because it was not included in the list of questions prepared for the
petition. Id at 495. The Court rejected this contention and concluded that because the grand
and petit jury claims had been treated together throughout the proceedings, the issue was
properly before the Court. Id.
125. Id at 497.
126. Id at 497-98. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that Congress enacted
various laws which prohibited exclusion of potential jurors from jury duty simply on the
basis of race. Id. As any such action in violation of these laws was a crime, the Court con-
cluded that "the existence of a constitutional violation does not depend on the circum-
stances of the person making the claim." Id at 498.
127. Id. Although discrimination in the selection of a jury may be illegal, the precise
issue before the court was whether a defendant could capitalize on this illegality. Id. The






132. Id at 498-99. The Court found that the discrimination in the jury selection pro-
cess harmed both the defendant and the jurors. Id. Discriminatory exclusions attached a
"brand of inferiority" to the excluded jurors and destroyed the possibility qf giving the de-
fendant a jury composed of a representative cross-section of the community. Id. The Court
speculated that, had this case originated after the Duncan decision applied the Sixth
Amendment to the states, the defendant might have had an action based on the Sixth
Amendment as well. Id at 499-500.
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Court, the defendant was not precluded from raising a claim de-
spite the lack of shared racial identity with the excluded jurors.133
The Court attributed success in raising such a claim to the de-
fendant's suffering injury as a result of the jury selection pro-
cess.13 4 In determining whether the defendant in Peters had suf-
fered such injury, the Court focused on the Due Process Clause. 3
5
The Court interpreted the clause as protecting a defendant both
from being tried before jurors who are incapable of rendering an
impartial verdict, and from circumstances which create the appear-
ance of bias. 3 6 Applying this interpretation to the case, the Court
concluded that a jury picked in an arbitrary manner increased the
risk of both actual bias and the appearance of bias. 3 ' The Court
found that such actions cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process.13 8 Moreover, the Court concluded that exclusion of a
"large identifiable" segment of the population deprived a jury of
"qualities of human nature and varities of human experience." 13 9
Elimination of such harms was naturally of great importance to
the defendant, and the Court consequently concluded that he had




135. Id at 501-05.
136. Id at 501-02.
137. Id at 502-03.
138. Id at 502.
139. Id at 503.
140. Id at 504-05. The Court reversed and remanded the lower court's opinion. Id at
505. Upon remand, if the defendant's allegations concerning the discriminatory selection
process were found to be true, the court believed that neither the indictment nor the convic-
tion would stand. Id.
The Peters holding does not carry a strong weight of authority, as only three Justices
joined in the plurality opinion. Id at 494. Justice Marshall announced the plurality opinion
and was joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart. Id. Justices White, Brennan and Powell
concurred in the judgment. Id at 505-07. The plurality concurrence did not dispute any part
of the majority opinion. Rather, it emphasized what it believed to be the spirit of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. The concurrence found this spirit to be reflected in the Civil Rights
Act of 1875:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law
shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United
States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude ....
Id at 505, citing 18 USC § 243.
The concurrence concluded that such language reflected a broader view than that given in
Hill v Texas, 316 US 400 (1942), in which both the defendant and the excluded jurors were
black. Peters, 407 US at 506-07.
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rhenquist dissented. Id at 507-13.
The dissent conceded that discriminatory selection processes were abhorrent, but argued
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The problem of racially discriminatory jury selection was before
the Court again in 1986 in the case of Batson v Kentucky. In Bat-
son, a black defendant was indicted on charges of second degree
burglary and receipt of stolen goods.' 41 During voir dire, the prose-
cutor used peremptory challenges to remove all four black persons
from the venire.142 The defendant sought to remove the jury on the
grounds that the selection process engaged in by the prosecutor
violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.1 43 Upon the defendant's request for a hearing on the mo-
tion, the court determined that parties may use peremptory chal-
lenges to strike anyone they desired. 14  Furthermore, the Sixth
Amendment applied only to the venire and not to the jury itself.
1 45
After conviction, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky. 46 The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower
that a different issue was before the Court. Id at 507. The real issue, according to the dis-
sent, was whether an illegally composed jury rendered invalid a criminal conviction when
there was no demonstration of prejudice to the defendant. Id. Admitting that such prejudice
may be inferred when the defendant and the excluded juror shared the same race, the dis-
sent suggested that such a presumption cannot exist when racial identity is not present. Id
at 508-09. The dissent further asserted that a presumption of validity could not be overcome
when the circumstances do not create a serious "probability of unfairness." Id at 509. The
dissent pointed to various cases in which the jury was affected by prejudice, but noted that
in each instance the circumstances created an unlikelihood of impartiality. Id, citing Tumey
v Ohio, 273 US 510 (1927), in which a juror had a personal interest in the decision, and
Jordan v Massachusetts, 225 US 167 (1912), in which a juror was found mentally incompe-
tent. Peters, 407 US at 509.
Admitting that inclusion of all segments of the population was enriching, the dissent
noted that the point was moot, for the defendant was tried before a jury that was guaran-
teed him by the Constitution. Id at 509-10. Moreover, the dissent argued that the plurality's
reliance upon the illegality of the jury composition was inconsequential to the question of
whether the defendant had suffered any injury. Id at 511. The dissent acknowledged that
proof of illegal composition may be relevant in a case where the defendant's injury was
"borderline," but asserted that in the case at bar, the defendant had offered virtually no
proof of injury. Id. To use the illegality of the jury composition in such circumstances would
be inappropriate. Id.
The dissent also disagreed with the plurality's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of
1875. Id at 512. The dissent opined that the Act prohibited the exclusion of jurors based on
race and provided criminal penalties for those violating the Act. Id. The dissent believed
that neither the Act nor the Constitution created extra constitutional rights for a defendant.
Id.
141. Batson, 476 US at 82.




146. Id. The defendant acknowledged that Swain prevented him from asserting an
equal protection claim based on the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges alone. Id. Yet
the defendant contended that he had proof of systematic exclusion, which would give rise to
an equal protection claim under Swain. Id. The defendant also asserted that the prosecu-
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court's denial of the Sixth Amendment claim and concluded that,
under Swain, a defendant must prove the systematic exclusion of
jurors. 147 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
14
The issue before the Court centered on the burden of proof es-
tablished under Swain.149 Setting the stage for a resolution of the
issue, the Court recounted the development of challenges to the
constitutionality of jury qualification statutes and the discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges.150 The Court asserted that the
burden of proof required to establish a prima facie case of discrim-
ination had changed since the decision rendered in Swain.'
5
1
According to the Court, the new burden of proof could be met in
a number of ways. 52 First, the defendant could demonstiate that
he was a member of a racial group which was subject to possible
discrimination and that members of his racial group had been ab-
sent from the jury venire for a long period of time.153 Such proof
would give rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination be-
cause "the result bespeaks discrimination.1 5 4 Secondly, a defend-
ant could meet the burden of proof by demonstrating that mem-
bers of his race were substantially under-represented on the venire
tor's actions consituted a violation of both the Sixth Amendment and Section Eleven of the
Kentucky constitution. Id.
147. Id at 84.
148. Batson v Kentucky, 471 US 1052 (1985).
149. Batson, 476 US at 82.
150. Id at 84-93. The Court first discussed the Strauder holding and concluded that it
served as a catalyst for the striking down of discriminatory qualification statutes. Id at 85.
The court found that the discrimination, which the Court in Strauder attempted to elimi-
nate, harmed both the excluded juror and the community as it undermined perceptions of
fairness in the judicial process. Id at 87.
Acknowledging the progress made since the Strauder decision, the Court nevertheless
concluded that discrimination still existed in the use of peremptory challenges. Id at 90. The
Court examined the resolution of this issue in Swain, particularly its establishment of the
burden of proof. Id at 90-93. According to the Court, Swain held that in asserting an equal
protection claim, the defendant has the initial burden of demonstrating the prosecutor's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges over a period of time. Id. As the defendant in
Swain could not specifically attribute the lack of black persons on venires during the previ-
ous fifteen years to the prosecutor's actions alone, despite the prosecutor's removal of black
persons on the venire in Strauder, the Court determined that the burden of proof was not
satisfied. Id at 92.
151. Id at 93-94. See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976), in which the Court held
that a prima facie case may be made by showing that the totality of facts gives rise to an
inference of discrimination. Washington, 426 US at 239-42. See also, Alexander v Louisi-
ana, 405 US 625, 632 (1972), in which the court held that the burden of explanation shifted
to the state once the prima facie showing was made. Alexander, 405 US at 632.
152. Batson, 476 US at 94.
153. Id.
154. Id, citing Hernandez v Texas, 347 US 475, 482 (1953).
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and that the jury selection process provided the opportunity for
such discrimination. 15 5 Consequently, the Court concluded that a
defendant could establish a prima facie showing of discrimination
based on the relevant facts of an individual case. 156 Once the de-
fendant had met this prima facie showing, the Court shifted the
burden of proof to the state to render a neutral explanation for the
challenge of a black juror.
157
Having modified the burden of proof regarding a prosecutor's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the court denied that
such a modification would either undermine the purpose of the
challenge or foster administrative difficulties."' The Court con-
cluded that the trial court's failure to allow inquiry into the prose-
cutor's use of peremptory challenges necessitated that the case be
remanded. 5 ' The Court acknowledged, however, that if on remand
the prosecutor failed to give a satisfactory explanation for his use
of peremptory challenges, the defendant's conviction would be
reversed. 0
Justice Marshall, in a separate concurrence in Batson, agreed
with the heart of the majority opinion, but felt that it did not go
far enough.16  He admitted that the decision handed down in
Strauder served to end discrimination in qualification laws, but he
asserted that discrimination had nevertheless survived in the form
of peremptory challenges. 62 The Justice pointed to the gross
under-representation of black persons on venires as evidence of
155. Batson, 476 US at 95.
156. Id. The Court concluded, moreover, that insistence upon proof of discrimination
over a period of time, as set forth in Swain, was inconsistent with the spirit of equal protec-
tion because it required that several people be discriminated against before any preventative
action could be taken. Id. The Court further reasoned that a single discriminatory act (the
discriminatory removal of jurors in one trial) was not justified due to the lack of similar
discriminatory actions (the discriminatory removal of jurors in several other cases). Id.
157. Id at 97. The Court noted, however, that the explanation need not be as detailed
as one required for a challenge for cause. Id. Yet the explanation cannot be merely an asser-
tion that the challenge was not motivated by race. Id.
158. Id at 99.
159. Id at 100.
160. Id. Three Justices concurred with the majority. Id at 110-11. Justice Stevens con-
curred and was joined by Justice Brennan. Id at 108-11. Justice O'Connor concurred in a
separate opinion. Id at 111. Justice White, who concurred as well, essentially agreed with
the majority's view that, because discrimination in jury selection remained so widespread,
inquiries should be made into the use of peremptory challenges. Id at 100-02. Justice White
noted that the Court's decision would likely foster a great deal of litigation in order to "spell
out the contours of the Court's equal protection holding." Id at 102.
161. Id at 102-08.
162. Id at 103.
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continued discrimination. 163
Justice Marshall's concurrence emphasized what he viewed to be
the only way to completely eliminate racial discrimination during
the trial: the elimination of peremptory challenges entirely.164 He
faulted the majority's modification of the burden of proof as inade-
quate.6 5 Allowing even one black person to serve as a juror, for
instance, would defeat a prima facie showing of discrimination
even if an enormous number of black persons were removed over
the years. 66 Justice Marshall also argued that even if a prima facie
case was established, the Court would be faced with the difficult
task of determining the prosecutor's motives.1 7 He concluded by
vehemently stating that peremptory challenges should be entirely
eliminated, both for the prosecution and for the defense.6 8
163. Id at 103-04.
164. Id.
165. Id at 105.
166. Id.
167. Id at 106.
168. Id at 103. Chief Justice Burger wrote a lengthy dissent. Id at 112-34. He con-
tended that the majority improperly addressed an equal protection claim which was never
before the Court, that the petitioner expressly denied raising such an issue, and that the
references to Swain were made in the context of a Sixth Amendment claim, not an equal
protection claim. Id at 112-19. Justice Burger believed that the Court could have reached
such an issue had it instructed the parties to prepare a brief on an equal protection chal-
lenge. Id. Absent such instructions, however, he considered it a transgression of jurispruden-
tial principles to have resolved the issue. Id.
Notwithstanding the Court's failure to abide by established rules of procedure, Justice
Burger addressed the issue as if it were properly before the Court. Id at 119. In this context,
Justice Burger contended that the majority not only failed to fully acknowledge the indis-
pensibility of the peremptory challenge in jury trials, but furthermore failed to discuss the
rationale of peremptory challenges. Id at 118-20. Justice Burger essentially recounted the
history of peremptory challenges as established in Swain. Id. Elimination of prejudice was
what Burger believed to be the rationale of allowing peremptory challenges. Id. Burger fur-
thermore noted that opening up peremptory challenges to racial discrimination claims
would necessarily force peremptory challenges to address other claims as well, such as sex
discrimination. Id at 124.
Justice Burger also faulted the majority for what he deemed to be an attempt to declare a
middle ground, which he believed could not be reached. Id at 127-28. The Justice described
the majority's demand for a "neutral explanation" as something short of a challenge for
cause. Id. This middle ground, he reasoned, would prove to be too difficult for trial judges to
handle, and would, ironically, inject prejudice back into the system. Id at 128. Justice Bur-
ger agreed with Justice White that the Court's decision should not be applied retroactively.
Id at 132.
Justice Rhenquist wrote a separate dissent as well. Id at 134-39. Justice Rhenquist essen-
tially disagreed with the majority's decision to allow equal protection challenges to peremp-
tory challenges. Id at 137. Justice Rhenquist believed that there was nothing unequal in the
striking of black persons from cases involving black defendants as long as white persons
were removed in cases involving white defendants, etc. Id. Peremptory challenges could not
be discriminatorily used, according to Justice Rhenquist, if all races were subject to them. Id
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In 1990, the use of peremptory challenges was again contested.
In Holland, a white defendant was charged with a variety of crimes
and was convicted by an all-white jury. 69 Despite the defendant's
objections, two black veniremen were removed from the jury
through the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.170 The de-
fendant contended that the removals violated his Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury composed of a representative cross section of
the community.'' The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the
conviction on grounds unrelated to the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment claims.1 2 The Supreme Court of Illinois reinstated the trial
court's decision and rejected the defendant's Sixth Amendment
claims.17 3 The United States Supreme Court granted Holland's pe-
tition for certiorari on Sixth Amendment grounds.
74
The first issue before the Court was whether a white defendant
had standing to challenge the removal of black veniremen from his
jury under the Sixth Amendment.17  The Court summarily dis-
posed of this issue by holding that, unlike an equal protection
claim, a Sixth Amendment claim does not require that the defend-
ant be of the same race as the excluded jurors. 76
Proceeding to the merits of the claim, the Court determined that
the prima facie test of discrimination formulated in Batson was
inapplicable to a Sixth Amendment claim. 77 The Court reasoned
that the Sixth Amendment only guaranteed a "fair possibility" of
impartiality, not the inclusion of all identifiable groups on the ve-
nire. 178 The Court stated that peremptory challenges were neces-
sary to eliminate the "extremes of partiality of both sides.' 1 79
The majority concluded by emphatically stating that "race as
such has nothing to do with the legal issue in this case."'' 0 Accord-
at 138.
169. Holland, 493 US 474 (1990). The defendant was charged with aggravated kidnap-





174. Holland v Illinois, 489 US 1051 (1989).
175. Holland, 493 US at 476.
176. Id at 476-77.
177. Id at 477-78.
178. Id at 478-88.
179. Id at 484, quoting Swain, 380 US at 219.
180. Holland, 493 US at 486. The Court stated:
We do not hold that the systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury system through
peremptory challenges is lawful; it obviously is not, see Batson, supra. We do not
even hold that the exclusion of blacks through peremptory challenges in this particu-
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ing to the Court, the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit a prosecu-
tor from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race. 181
The Court conceded that a potential challenge to the use of pe-
remptory challenges might lie in the Equal Protection Clause.
18 2
Justice Marshall wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun. 8 Justice Marshall began his dissent by conceding that
the Court did not answer the question of whether a defendant's
race affects his standing to raise the holding established in Bat-
son. 8 4 Neverthless, Justice Marshall claimed that "five Justices
[agree] that a defendant's race is irrelevant to the Fourteenth
Amendment standing injury."' 8 5 Thus, Marshall reasoned that a
defendant's race would not preclude him from raising a Batson
challenge.'
Justice Marshall then turned to the question of whether a prose-
cutor's use of peremptory challenges for the removal of jurors
based on race violated the Sixth Amendment.8 7 Justice Marshall
emphatically stated that it did. 88 Justice Marshall's basic conten-
tion was that the Sixth Amendment required a jury to be not only
impartial, which was conceded to by the majority, but representa-
lar trial was lawful. Nor do we even hold that this particular (white) defendant does
not have a valid constitutional challenge to such racial exclusion. All we hold is that
he does not have a valid constitutional challenge based on the Sixth Amend-
ment-which no more forbids the prosecutor to strike jurors on the basis of race than
it forbids him to strike them on the basis of innumerable other generalized
characteristics.
Holland, 493 US at 486-87.
181. Id.
182. Id at 487-88. Holland failed to seek a review of the denial of the equal protection
claim. Id. Certiorari was limited to the Sixth Amendment issue. Id at 487 n 3.
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id at 487. Although he agreed with
the majority's conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit the use of racially
motivated peremptory challenges, Justice Kennedy wrote separately to assert that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the use of such challenges. Id. Moreover, he contended that any
defendant could raise such a challenge and that standing was not predicated upon a sharing
of racial identity. Id. To limit standing to those cases in which both the excluded jurors and
the defendant were of the same race would contravene the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id at 488-90.
183. Id at 490-504.
184. Id at 492.
185. Id. Justice Marshall argued that "the fundamental principle undergirding the de-
cision in Batson was that 'a State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of
race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection
Clause.'" Id at 491.
186. Id at 492.
187. Id at 492-93.
188. Id at 493.
Duquesne Law Review
tive of the community as well.189 Justice Marshall believed that the
fair cross-section requirement served a different purpose than the
requirement of impartiality. 190 A fair cross-section protects against
an overzealous prosecutor, preserves public confidence in the judi-
cial system, and fosters a belief that participating in the adminis-
tration of justice is part of civic responsibility.'9 ' Justice Marshall
reasoned that this purpose transcended the various phases of the
jury selection process and, therefore, that the discriminatory re-
moval of jurors was prohibited at every stage; whether the removal
is accomplished by the summoning of the venire or the exercising
of peremptory challenges is immaterial. 192
Justice Marshall conceded that the fair cross-section require-
ment did not necessitate that each jury mirror the composition of
the community.'93 He merely stated that "only if prospective ju-
rors are purposely excluded on account of their membership in a
distinctive group . . . is the defendant denied the possibility of a
fair cross-section of the community."
9 4
Although the Powers decision may be a natural and rational ex-
tension of earlier holdings, it nevertheless also adds to the contra-
dictions and confusion inherent in those earlier holdings. The very
nature and purpose of peremptory challenges and of equal protec-
tion claims suggest an irreversible dichotomy. Yet the Court has
paradoxically introduced an equal protection analysis to the use of
peremptory challenges while simultaneously attempting to pre-
serve the use of the challenges.
Powers presented the Court with the opportunity to resolve the
inconsistencies by forever eliminating the use of peremptory chal-
lenges and fully embracing the concept of equal protection. The
Court failed to do so. Instead, the Court attempted to reconcile
two diametrically opposed theories. As one commentator has
noted,
189. Id at 493-94. Justice Marshall argued:
Contrary to the majority's implication, the fair-cross-section requirement is not based
on the constitutional demand for impartiality; it is founded on the notion that what
is denominated a "jury" is not a "jury" in the eyes of the Constitution unless it is
drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
Id at 494.
190. Id at 494-95.
191. Id at 495.
192. Id at 496.
193. Id at 497.
194. Id at 499. Justice Stevens also filed a dissent in which he argued that Batson
prohibited the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges under both the Sixth Amend-
ment and the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 504-20.
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Where racial identification is concerned, the rationale of the peremptory
challenge is at war with the idea of non-discriminatory selection of jurors.
The latter is intended to produce juries that are fair and are recognized as
such by the public. It rests on the premise that to accomplish this purpose
the jury must reflect the community's heterogeneous elements, or at least
not exclude any of the community's components. The peremptory challenge
system, on the other hand, is intended to allow each party to exclude mem-
bers of groups which may be unfriendly to his own cause or predisposed
toward his opponents. It permits the lawyer to eliminate heterogeniety in
pursuit of the friendliest . . . jury.1 95
Concededly, perhaps the Court felt that to eliminate the right to
peremptory challenges, which are granted by statute, would be to
exercise unwarranted judicial activism. Yet the Court did not inti-
mate that this was the reason for refusing to abolish peremptory
challenges; there was no hint of deference to the legislature. The
Court did not even acknowledge that the concept of equal protec-
tion inherently contradicts the right to use peremptory challenges.
This irreconcilable dichotomy mandates that the Court choose be-
tween either preserving the "rich tradition" of peremptory chal-
lenges or embracing the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion. The change in circumstances giving rise to peremptory
challenges, the inherent contradiction in making a "racial inquiry"
into the exercise of a peremptory challenge, and the nature of the
Equal Protection Clause demand that the Court eliminate the pe-
remptory challenge.
As previously established, peremptory challenges were originally
designed to eliminate prejudice.196 At common law, defendants
were tried by members of the community. 197 Because communities
were generally small and the list of qualified jurors was limited,
defendants were often tried before people they knew.'9 8 Peremp-
tory challenges were thus created to remove any jurors who may be
biased for or against the defendant based on their personal knowl-
edge of the defendant. 99
These circumstances, which admittedly may have justified the
original use of peremptory challenges, do not exist today (at least
in non-rural areas), as communities are larger and, consequently,
the pools of potential jurors are much greater. The change in cir-
cumstances demands a corresponding change in the treatment of
195. Kuhn, 41 S Cal L Rev at 287 (cited in note 69).






peremptory challenges. Failure to eliminate these challenges only
arms an attorney with a tool to be wielded in an arbitrary manner.
A peremptory challenge allows for the "sudden impressions and
unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare
looks and gestures of another" to be acted upon.2 00 By preserving
the use of peremptory challenges despite a change in the circum-
stances justifying the use of the challenges, the Court is perpetuat-
ing the very prejudices and discrimination which the challenges
were designed to eliminate.
Having failed to capitalize on the opportunity to abolish pe-
remptory challenges, the Court failed, moreover, to use Powers to
modify the holding in Batson. Batson called for the issuance of a
"racially neutral" explanation if the prosecutor had used peremp-
tory challenges in a manner which appeared to be discrimina-
tory. 0 1 Yet Batson provided no guideline as to what "racially neu-
tral" required.0 2
The Court's treatment of this "inquiry" in Powers is defective
on two grounds. First, the Court utterly failed to acknowledge that
allowing inquiries into the exercise of a peremptory challenge is
antithetical to the very definition of a peremptory challenge. Per-
emptories are to be exercised without definition or explanation.
Challenges for cause require explanations. Before Batson, there ex-
isted no median between these two types of challenges. The Court,
explicitly in Batson and impliedly in Powers (by relying on Bat-
son), created a "quasi-challenge for cause."
Secondly, the Court in Powers shirked the duty of providing
guidelines or even an explanation of what constituted a "racially
neutral" explanation. Such a term is extremely amorphous and will
provide little help to trial courts attempting to address the possible
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Rather than seize
this opportunity for clarification, the Court merely remanded the
case and stated that the district courts were to establish proce-
dures for inquiring into the use of peremptory challenges. 203
Implicit in the Court's failure to acknowledge the anachronistic
nature of the peremptory challenge by modifying the requirements
of an inquiry into the exercise of a challenge is a corresponding
failure to fully recognize the importance of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection. Unlike the use of a peremp-
200. Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., US , 111 S Ct 2077, 2090 (1991).
201. Batson, 476 US at 97-98.
202. Id.
203. Powers, 111 S Ct at 1374.
1050 Vol. 30:1025
Recent Decisions
tory challenge, which is not a constitutionally guaranteed right, the
right to equal protection is protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which "forbids the arbitrary classification of human
beings.
'204
When in contradiction, a nonconstitutional right must yield to a
constitutional right. Yet the Court places peremptory challenges
on par with a constitutional guarantee. The Court must make a
commitment either to the preservation of peremptory challenges or
to the ensurance of equal protection. Vacillating between the two
merely creates confusion. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the
Court will make such a commitment soon. As Justice Marshall has
stepped down from the bench, those pushing for the elimination of
the peremptory challenge have lost their most ardent supporter.
Moreover, since Powers was handed down, it has been cited in
other Supreme Court decisions, none of which overruled or modi-
fied the decision.20 5 In Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., 20 6 the
Supreme Court relied upon Powers in holding that race-based ex-
clusion of jurors by a private litigant in a civil case violated the
equal protection rights of the challenged jurors. 20 7 The changing
composition of the bench, as well as the subsequent case law indi-
cates that, at least for the time being, the contradictions and con-
fusion surrounding the race-based use of peremptory challenges
will continue.
Carolyn Holtschlag
204. Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 170 (cited in note 79).
205. See Edmonson, 111 S Ct 2077 (1991), and Hernandez v New York, US , 111 S
Ct 1859 (1991).
206. 111 S Ct 2077 (1991).
207. Edmonson, 111 S Ct at 2087-88. In Edmonsn, a black construction worker
sought compensation for injuries allegedly stemming from his company's negligence. Id at
2080-81. During voir dire, the defendant peremptorily removed two of three black jurors. Id
at 2081. Edmonson demanded a racially neutral explanation pursuant to Batson. Id. Al-
though his demands were initially unsuccessful, the Supreme Court found Powers to be
persuasive and ultimately held that racially based peremptory challenges in a civil case vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 2087. Moreover, the court addressed Edmonson's
standing in accordance with the requirements set forth in Powers and determined that Ed-
monson satisfied the requirements. Id at 2088.
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